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Ethicists in the normative tradition seem to believe that moral knowledge is possible. Yet there is widespread 
disagreement about what the fundamental principle of morality is. Because of the presence of conflicting 
theories of rightness, it is important to ask how moral theories can be established and refuted. 
 
At least three different methods of establishing a moral theory and refuting competitors have been employed. 
The first method appeals to moral intuitions. Advocates of a particular view will claim that theories in 
competition with theirs entail moral judgments that are rejected by most people, while their own moral theory 
yields acceptable results. This method of establishing and refuting moral theories is looked upon with suspicion, 
however, and for several reasons. First, it is not clear that there is a unique set of moral intuitions shared by 
most people. Second, an appeal to ordinary moral beliefs may be question-begging since most moral theories 
are reformist; that is, most theories recommend that we alter some of our moral beliefs. And third, people's 
moral intuitions may be false.1 
 
The second method of establishing a moral theory involves an appeal to reason alone. Thus some ethicists have 
argued that to deny their first principle is contradictory. To adhere to any competing theory, then, is not just a 
moral mistake; it is irrational.2 If this method can be employed successfully, then moral theories can be proved 
and refuted in the strict senses of those terms. Though most moral philosophers wish that this method of proof 
and refutation could succeed in ethics, few believe that it can. 
 
A third method is to evaluate moral theories on the basis of certain principles, apparently metaethical in nature. 
When this method is employed, it seems that these principles are regarded as conditions that an adequate moral 
theory must satisfy. The argument form of the third method is this: (i) An adequate moral theory must satisfy 
principle P. (ii) Moral theory M does not satisfy principle P. (iii) Therefore, moral theory M is not adequate. 
 
In this essay I shall examine this third method of evaluating moral theories. Because of the dissatisfaction with 
the first two methods, understanding the third is important. Yet, though many philosophers have employed this 
method, little has been done to investigate its nature and presuppositions. What is crucial but unclear is the 
status of the principles employed in this type of argument. They cannot be substantive moral principles or based 
on intuitions, it seems, for otherwise the third method will fall prey to the same objections as the first. Nor does 
it seem that these principles can be established by an appeal to reason alone; if they could, the third method 
would reduce to the second. But if these principles can be established by neither moral intuitions nor reason 
alone, what is their basis for support? 
 
Part II 
The third method of refutation surfaces most frequently in discussions of egoism. In order to examine some of 
these criticisms, we need first to state what ethical egoism says. All versions of egoism agree about how an 
agent should make first-person moral judgments: if I am an ethical egoist, I should perform an act if and only if 
doing so will produce at least as great a balance of good over evil for me as any alternative act. Egoists disagree 
among themselves, however, when it comes to making second- and third-person moral judgments. A universal 
ethical egoist (UEE) says that every person ought to do what will most further his own self-interest. Thus if I 
am a UEE I will judge that you ought to maximize your self-interest and Jones ought to maximize his self-
interest. An individual ethical egoist (IEE) says that every other person ought to do what will further the 
interests of the individual egoist. Thus if I am an IEE, I will judge that you ought to maximize my self-interest 
and Jones ought to maximize my self-interest too. A personal ethical egoist (PEE) eschews second- and third-
person moral judgments. If I am a PEE I will say only that I ought to maximize my own interest.3 
 
Various criticisms have been leveled against these different forms of egoism. The usual criticism of PEE is that 
it is no moral theory at all; it is rather a private policy of action.4 The underlying assumption of this objection is 
captured in the following principle: 
 
P1: Every moral theory must provide a basis for judging the rightness or wrongness of the conduct of 
any individual, oneself or another. 
 
Since PEE provides no basis for assessing the actions of persons other than the egoist himself, it is not an 
adequate moral theory. 
 
The major criticism of IEE is more complex. Initially , it might seem that IEE violates the principle of 
universalizability , the requirement that if one judges that act X is right, then one is committed to judging that 
any act like X in all relevant respects is also right.5 This need not be the case, however, as can be seen by 
envisioning how the IEE responds to the challenge, "Why should your interests count more than anyone else's?" 
There are two responses that the IEE can make. First, he might point to some characteristic that he possesses 
which makes him alone deserving of special attention. In order not to violate the principle of universalizability, 
though, he must agree that we should promote the good of anyone else having this characteristic. It is unlikely 
that any person has a characteristic which is both possessed by no one else and is morally relevant. A more 
significant difficulty, though, is that the IEE will be altering his theory if he makes this response. It will no 
longer be his self-interest that all people ought to promote; rather, it will be the characteristic in question which 
serves as the supreme principle of his system.6 The IEE' s second response is that the characteristic that makes 
an act right is that it maximizes ____________'s interest, where the blank is to be filled in with the IEE's name. 
This response does not violate the principle of universalizability; the IEE does assess all actions by the same 
criterion. It does, however, violate another principle, the requirement of generality: 
 
P2: Every moral theory must be general; it must contain no referential terms designating particular 
agents, actions, or circumstances.7 
 
But this version of IEE does contain a referential term designating a particular agent. So, in order to satisfy the 
principle of universalizability, IEE must either give up its egoistic basis or violate the requirement of generality. 
 
Because UEE does not fall prey to the same objections that PEE and IEE do, it is usually thought to be the most 
plausible version of egoism. But even UEE has been subjected to criticisms. One argument claims that UEE 
must be rejected because it violates the following principle: 
 
P3: Every moral theory must be consistently promulgatable.8 
 
Let us say that a moral theory is consistently promulgatable if it is possible (at least often) to advocate the 
doctrine publicly without thereby performing an action judged to be wrong by the doctrine itself. The critic 
contends that UEE violates P3 because of conflicts of interests. Often if others consistently pursue their own 
interests, this will conflict with my interests. If I advocate UEE publicly, I will be urging others to pursue only 
their own interests. And to the extent that I succeed in convincing others to pursue only their self-interests, I 
will be acting against my interests, thereby violating UEE. So, since UEE violates P3, it is not an adequate 
moral theory. 
 
A closely related objection focuses on giving moral advice.9 According to this objection, UEE is not an 
adequate moral theory because it violates: 
 
P4: Every moral theory must (normally) allow its proponents to give others sincere moral advice (when 
solicited). 
 
Let us say that a moral theory, M, allows its follower, A, to give sincere moral advice to another, B, if it allows 
A to recommend to B that B do what A has judged, in accord with M, that B ought to do. If A is a UEE and B 
comes to A for moral advice, A will judge that B ought to do that which is in B's interest. But if the act that will 
most advance B's interest is contrary to A's interest, what should A advise B to do? A little reflection suggests 
that giving advice is itself an action performed by an agent. And if the person giving advice is a UEE, he should 
perform actions designed to further his own interests. Therefore, in the case in question, A will judge that B 
ought to perform that act which will maximize his own, B's, interests; but if that act conflicts with A's own 
interests, he will advise B to do something else. And, the critic assumes, these cases are commonplace. So, UEE 
violates P4. 
 
Though there are many other criticisms of UEE,10 the two stated here represent adequately the form of argument 
that I wish to examine. 
 
Part III 
I do not propose to examine the adequacy of ethical egoism, nor even to test the plausibility of the principles 
employed to refute egoism, but merely to investigate the method used in these attempted refutations. In 
assessing this method of argumentation, the crucial question concerns the status of the principles appealed to, 
P1-P4. Are these principles metaethical, normative, or something else altogether? Recall that the first method of 
refuting moral theories appeals to intuitions about particular cases. But while it seems obvious that egoism 
yields judgments that most find counterintuitive, appealing to this is rare and does not seem to be a convincing 
way to refute egoism.11 Yet the alleged refutations of egoism just discussed do seem to have initial plausibility, 
even if they fail ultimately. This suggests that the principles employed in these arguments do more than appeal 
to moral intuitions; either they are metaethical principles or they are normative principles at a higher level of 
generality. 
 
In order to discuss the status of these principles, let us distinguish, although crudely, between normative ethics 
and metaethics. Whenever one asserts that a certain action is right (or wrong), or that an action of a certain type 
is always right, or when one states the criterion of rightness, one is engaged in normative ethics. By contrast, 
metaethics is concerned with the analysis of ethical expressions, their meanings, their logical functions, and 
more generally with what is going on when people engage in ethical discourse.12 It is often said that a defining 
characteristic of metaethical principles is that they are normatively neutral (though later we must question this). 
To say that metaethical principles are normatively neutral is to say, minimally, that they entail nothing 
concerning the rightness or wrongness of particular acts and that they make no moral recommendations 
whatsoever. According to this doctrine, no normative questions are answered by metaethical claims.13 Since the 
task of the metaethicist is to give an account of the meanings of moral concepts and to explain moral reasoning, 
metaethical principles must be consistent with all moral judgments regardless of whether the metaethicist 
approves of those judgments. A.J. Ayer makes this point when he claims that "all moral theories, intuitionist, 
naturalistic, objectivist, emotive and the rest, in so far as they are philosophical theories, are neutral as regards 
actual conduct."14 And R. M. Hare argues, "We cannot, even if we establish the meaning of moral words, pass 
from this to conclusions of substance about moral questions."15 
 
It is reasonable to construe the principles employed in the third method of refutation as metaethical since many 
of the critics of egoism try to show that that doctrine is not adequate because it is not a moral theory at all. But 
if we construe this method of refutation in this way, there are several problems. First, it is difficult to explain 
how metaethical principles, which are supposedly normatively neutral, can be employed to refute substantive 
moral theories. Second, if these principles are advanced as stating defining characteristics of morality, it seems 
they will do little damage to egoism (or any other theory). The egoist can agree that his view is not a moral one 
and claim instead that he is offering a competing theory of conduct. As long as egoism is coherent, it will do 
little good to show that it is not a moral theory. 
 
There is a third difficulty that is more severe. It shows that the principles employed in these arguments against 
egoism cannot consistently be construed as metaethical, at least if metaethical principles are characterized as 
normatively neutral in the sense described above. Let us clarify this sense of neutrality. One philosopher puts it 
this way: "No definition of moral terms or analysis of moral reasoning shall favor one set of moral principles 
over another, nor one answer to a moral question over another."16 In this same vein, another writes, "What is 
wanted is some general account of morality which will apply to all moralities, to those we are disposed to reject 
as well as to that which we are disposed to accept."17 This account of normative neutrality, however, has the 
consequence that metaethical principles cannot be employed to refute moral theories. Suppose that I propose 
and argue for a metaethical principle which says that a moral theory must possess characteristic C. I argue 
further that egoism does not possess C, and therefore egoism is not a moral theory. To respond to this argument, 
the egoist need only point out that an adequate metaethical principle must account for all uses of moral 
language, and the proposed one does not; it does not account for the egoist's judgments and use of language. 
 
Let me state this third difficulty another way. Assuming that metaethics must be normatively neutral, what 
counts as a moral doctrine must be decided in advance. Our ideas about what moral views are constitute the data 
that metaethical theories must explain.18 Thus if egoism is regarded (pre-analytically) as a moral view, then any 
adequate metaethical principles will have to reflect the egoist's language, his judgments, and the like. Any 
principle which does not do so can be justly accused by the egoist of being inadequate because it does not 
square with all of the data; it is normatively selective. On the other hand, if at the outset egoism is not regarded 
as a moral view—that is, the discourse of egoists is not data that metaethicists must account for—then it would 
seem that any proof that egoism is not an adequate moral theory will be superfluous. One must conclude, then, 
that when the demand for normative neutrality is understood to require that metaethical principles account for 
all moral discourse, metaethical principles cannot be employed to refute what is regarded as a moral doctrine.19 
 
The argument just pursued suggests that proponents of the third method of refutation must make one of two 
moves. One option is to maintain that principles P1-P4 are both metaethical and normatively neutral. This move 
requires the presentation of an alternative account of moral neutrality, one that is weaker than that given above. 
The other option is to acknowledge that P1-P4 are not normatively neutral, but deny that this undermines their 
adequacy.20 
 
There is something appealing about the first move. The account of moral neutrality sketched above seems too 
strong. To take an extreme case, suppose that someone advances the principle that an adequate moral theory 
must not endorse contradictory claims. Now suppose we discover that moral theory M does endorse 
contradictory claims. It will follow that the proposed principle is not morally neutral because it favors some 
moral principles over others. Such a claim, however, is implausible. Though principles of logic are normative in 
one sense, their normative content does not violate the requirement of moral neutrality. 
 
Consider a weaker account of the requirement of moral neutrality. A principle is morally neutral, we might say, 
if it does not endorse judgments about the rightness and wrongness of acts, nor, in conjunction with factual 
premises, entail such judgments.21 Assessed by this account, principles P1-P4 are morally neutral. This account 
seems too weak, however. Suppose that someone proposes the following principle: An adequate moral theory 
must not allow the consequences alone to determine the moral status of actions. Such a principle does not say 
anything about the moral status of any particular acts, nor does it entail such judgments in conjunction with 
factual premises. This is so because a theory different from but extensionally equivalent with a purely 
consequentialist theory will satisfy the proposed principle. Yet that principle is thoroughly anti-consequentialist 
and so is morally loaded. To avoid this consequence, it might be suggested that a principle is not neutral if it 
presupposes the truth of a particular moral theory. But this addition will not disqualify the proposed principle 
from the realm of the metaethical; that principle is satisfied by many conflicting anti-consequentialist theories. 
Alternatively, it might be suggested that a principle is not neutral if it entails the falsity of a particular moral 
theory. This addition, however, will face the same problems that plague the strong account of moral neutrality. 
Since any principle incompatible with a particular moral theory will have relinquished its claim to moral 
neutrality, it will follow that no metaethical principle can be employed to refute moral theories. 
 
There may, of course, be a more plausible account of moral neutrality than I have considered here. But unless 
such an account is advanced, proponents of the third method of refutation will have to make the second move 
mentioned above. But if they acknowledge that the principles they are employing possess normative content, 
this creates a difficulty. It seems question-begging to use normative principles to defeat any moral theory, 
including egoism. It seems, then, that proponents of the third method of refutation face a dilemma. On the one 
hand, if they maintain that the principles they employ are metaethical and morally neutral in the strong sense, it 
seems that these principles cannot be utilized to reject moral theories. On the other hand, if the principles have 
normative content, then it seems that the arguments advanced are open to the charge of question-begging. 
Wrestling with this dilemma will be the major task pursued throughout the remainder of this essay. The 
completion of it should give us a better understanding of the third method. 
 
Part IV 
For now, let us focus on principles P3 and P4. It will be useful to compare these principles with other familiar 
moral precepts. Consider particular moral rules, such as prohibitions against killing, stealing, and breaking 
promises. One major difference is that moral rules are action-guiding, while P3 and P4 are not. Another 
difference concerns their level of generality. Each of the specific rules is limited to a particular act-type. By 
contrast, consider P4. The activity that this principle refers to is applicable (when advice is sought) whether the 
act in question concerns killing, stealing, keeping a promise, or some other act. P3 is general in this same way. 
 
There are, however, other precepts which are also more general than moral rules but which have a status 
different from P3 and P4. Consider, as examples, the principle of utility and Kant's categorical imperative. Like 
P3 and P4 but unlike specific rules, these two principles purport to apply to all moral acts. There are, however, 
differences between P3 and P4, on the one hand, and the principle of utility and the categorical imperative, on 
the other. The most important difference is that the principles of utility and the categorical imperative, in 
conjunction with factual claims, imply moral conclusions about particular acts and serve as a basis for justifying 
specific moral rules. Principles P3 and P4, by contrast, cannot be employed to justify particular moral rules, nor 
do they, in conjunction with factual claims, yield conclusions regarding the status of killing, stealing, or keeping 
one's promises. To emphasize this point, consider again P4. Because of the inclusion of the word "sincere," this 
principle might be confused with a moral rule requiring one to be truthful. P4 differs from such a rule, however; 
it is consistent with a theory which permits (or even requires) an agent to be untruthful on occasions. All that P4 
requires is that a moral theory normally permit its proponents to give others sincere moral advice.22 
 
Principles P3 and P4 do seem to be normative; yet they differ from other familiar moral precepts. Since P3 and 
P4 appear to have normative content, are more general than specific moral rules, and at the same time are 
compatible with competing moral theories, I propose that we call them meta-prescriptions .23 Calling them 
prescriptions accurately reflects that they possess normative content; using the prefix 'meta' conveys their higher 
level of generality and apparent compatibility with many (or all) competing moral theories.24 
 
In order to clarify the normative nature of meta-prescriptions, it will be helpful to try to discover the rationale 
underlying P3 and P4. As a first step in this direction, note that there is a more general meta-prescription that 
captures a common thread running through P3 and P4.25 
 
P5: It is morally desirable that agents perform their actual moral obligations. 
 
The idea behind P5 is this: if the only change in a world is that an agent fulfills an actual obligation, the change 
is a morally desirable one. The principle is stated with reference to actual requirements, and the word 'actual' is 
intended to do double duty. First, this qualification restricts the principle to actual obligations, not prima facie 
ones. If a relatively trivial prima facie obligation conflicts with a serious one, it will be morally undesirable for 
an agent to fulfill the first of these prima facie obligations. The second job that the qualification does is to 
indicate that the obligation is one that the agent really has, not just one that he believes he has. It may not be 
desirable to have a person perform an act that he believes is his duty, when in fact the act is the worst that he 
can perform. 
 
One other point of clarification is in order. Though P5 possesses normative content, it is neither a 
consequentialist nor a deontological principle. In P5 no account of the basis or ground of obligations is given or 
presupposed; it is compatible with consequentialist and deontological theories alike. Proponents of conflicting 
theories of rightness can agree that it is desirable that agents fulfill their actual obligations. It is not unusual to 
have principles that are normative but compatible with conflicting moral theories.26 
 
In order to say more about the rationale for meta-prescriptions P3 and P4, let us draw a distinction. Let us say 
that first-order moral activities are those that involve agents fulfilling (or failing to fulfill) their obligations, 
such as keeping promises, telling the truth, and the like. Second-order moral activities are typically designed to 
promote the occurrence of first-order activities. Examples of second-order activities include giving moral 
advice, promulgating one's moral views, and minimizing the occasions on which one faces situations where one 
will (probably) do the wrong thing because of one's own moral weakness. These latter activities are second-
order in that they are parasitic on first-order activities. If it were not for the fact that some actions are morally 
required and some are forbidden, questions about giving moral advice, promulgating one's moral views, and 
guarding against one's own moral weakness would not arise. 
 
Meta-prescriptions P3 and P4 refer to second-order activities which, the principles say, must be consistent with 
or permitted by a moral theory. These activities are related to P5. An agent who promulgates his moral theory or 
offers sincere moral advice, unless he is being unduly sanctimonious, usually hopes to encourage others to do 
what he understands to be the right thing.27 And if he is successful, others will believe that they ought to 
perform certain acts. One would think that, minimally, proponents of a moral theory would approve of behavior 
which has (or is intended to have) the result that agents fulfill their actual obligations (specified by the theory). 
 
To demonstrate how central P5 is, let us compare UEE with (act) utilitarianism. It may seem that any act-
consequentialist theory will conflict with P3 and P4 because such theories evaluate the acts of promulgating a 
moral theory and giving sincere moral advice in terms of the consequences those acts produce. And indeed there 
will be occasions when utilitarians will not give sincere moral advice or will not promulgate their theory. This 
will be so if, for some reason, promulgating utilitarianism or advising someone to act according to utilitarianism 
will cause that agent to act contrary to the dictates of utilitarianism. In short, utilitarians will not give sincere 
moral advice or will not promulgate their theory if these acts will fail to be a means to the desired end, namely, 
that others act according to utilitarianism. But this shows that utilitarians have as their goal that all agents do 
what the utilitarian theory says that they should do; utilitarians accept P5. The arguments that appeal to P3 and 
P4, however, show that UEEs do not accept P5; they do not have as their goal that others act in accord with 
UEE. 
 
Meta-prescription P5 seems basic. It seems that, minimally, a moral theory is to serve as a guide for the 
behavior of all those agents who are bound by it. UEE, by definition, applies to all moral agents. When a moral 
theory yields the judgment that a person ought (all thing considered) to perform an action, then the "ought" has 
an action-guiding function. One who endorses the theory must endorse the particular judgment, and so has a 
stake in people's doing as they ought.28 But if UEE conflicts with P3, P4, and P5, then it is not action-guiding in 
this sense. This, I hope, helps to clarify the rationale underlying meta-prescriptions P3 and P4. 
 
In concluding this section, something about the status of P1 and P2 must be said. Since I have called P3 and 
P4 meta-prescriptions and since I have not affixed that label to P1 and P2, this suggests that I think there is a 
difference between the former two principles and the latter two. And, indeed, there is one obvious difference. 
P3 and P4 refer to second-order activities which are performed in moral contexts. By contrast, P1 and P2 do 
not refer to activities at all; rather they demand that moral theories be able to make certain judgments and 
that they satisfy certain restrictions in stating the criterion of right actions. Whether we call P1 and P2 meta-
prescriptions, however, is not important. What is significant is that none of the four principles is normatively 
neutral in the strong sense discussed earlier. And this suggests either that the doctrine of the normative 
neutrality of metaethics is unrealistic or that the line between metaethics and normative ethics is much 
fuzzier than many have supposed. 
 
Part V 
The major issue still outstanding concerns the conclusions to be drawn about the general form of argument 
that appeals to principles like P1 -P4. If these arguments simply posit conditions that a moral theory must 
satisfy and if the principles cited have normative content, theorists whose views have been defeated by such 
arguments will raise the charge of question-begging. Seeing what can be said, in general terms, in support of 
P1-P4 can show the degree to which this objection can be combated. 
 
It seems that what we normally call moral views satisfy the conditions set out in P1-P4. We can put the point 
this way. There is an activity practiced by many people. On many points, these people disagree. They even 
disagree about the central question around which the activity revolves (namely, what makes an action right). 
But there is much about which they agree, and this serves to delineate the activity they are pursuing. They 
agree that that for which they are searching is to guide the behavior of all moral agents, that it must be 
general, and that agents may encourage others to do what is right by promulgating their theories or by 
offering sincere advice. So in spite of the differences that divide utilitarians, Kantians, simple rule-oriented 
theories, and others, there are enough similarities to justify saying that they are operating from a similar point 
of view and that they are pursuing the same activity. It is neither question-begging nor an error to notice 
these important similarities and to develop corresponding categories, such as that of a moral theory. Such a 
categorization has the consequence that some views, called "moral" by their proponents, are so different 
from the others that they fall outside the category. This should be neither surprising nor disturbing. If 
someone, after studying physics, chemistry, biology, and geology, develops an account of what it is to be a 
science, we would not immediately dismiss the account as skewed simply because it entails that neither the 
work of astrologists nor the work of creationists is genuine science.29 To demand otherwise is to hold that an 
adequate account of what morality (or science) is must admit into the category any view described by its 
proponents as moral (or scientific). Such a demand is too strong. It renders any sort of metatheoretical 
activity virtually impossible. 
 
Viewing arguments that appeal to principles such as P1-P4 in this way absolves them of the charge of 
question-begging, I think, but at a price. We are not justified in concluding that a theory which fails to satisfy 
these principles is false; we must draw the more modest conclusion that it is not a genuine moral theory. This 
suggests that we ought to look at theories which fail to satisfy these principles in a different way. 
 
How we should regard ethical egoism can best be illustrated if we think of discussions about morality 
occurring at two different levels. At one level, moral disputes occur among those who already take morality 
seriously. At this level the disputants agree that some acts are right and some acts are wrong; these are not 
assumptions they are inclined to challenge. They disagree, however, about the moral status of some 
particular acts and about what makes acts right. If members of this group are sufficiently thoughtful, 
different theories of rightness will emerge. We can imagine that some will be act-utilitarians, some rule-
utilitarians, others Kantians, or followers of Ross, or Thomists. These people argue among themselves, each 
trying to convince the other of the correctness of his position. 
 
There is a more fundamental level at which disputes about morality occur. Some challenge the very 
assumption operative at the first level, namely, that some acts are right and some are wrong. These people, 
whom we shall call amoralists, think that the entire debate among utilitarians, Kantians, and others is 
pointless. Morality, they say, is a sham. Amoralists do not believe that there is a rational basis for moral 
judgments. So, if morality requires sacrifice, agents have no good reason to be moral. 
 
Now suppose that a moral dispute is occurring and an ethical egoist comes along. He purports to give an 
alternative account of what makes acts right, and so he seems to be debating at the first level, on a par with 
utilitarians, Kantians, and the others. All of the others reject the egoist's theory of right. But one of the more 
reflective opponents notices how different egoism is from the theories proposed by his cohorts and himself. 
He notices that even though utilitarians, Kantians, and others disagree about the moral status of particular 
acts and about the criterion of rightness, they agree that it is (normally) appropriate to promulgate one's 
moral theory and to offer sincere moral advice (when asked). Egoism, however, rejects these claims. And 
unlike the others, the egoist does not have as a goal that those who are judged by his theory shall abide by 
it.30 The reflective opponent begins to think that the egoist is not competing on the same level with 
utilitarians, Kantians, and the others; instead, the egoist is challenging the very enterprise in which they are 
engaged. Put another way, the egoist's language suggests that he is arguing at one level; the content of his 
position, however, indicates that we will achieve a better understanding of egoism if we regard it as 
presenting a challenge at a more fundamental level. The egoist is better understood as an amoralist.31 
 
If this suggestion is correct, then arguments such as those that appeal to P1-P4 have the effect, collectively, 
of demonstrating that egoism is not a moral theory on a par with utilitarianism and Kantianism. The egoist 
instead is an amoralist in disguise. Thus, arguments of the sort discussed here do not defeat egoism (that is, 
show that it is false). To do that, one will either have to show that not taking the interests of others into 
account is itself irrational, or one will have to demonstrate that there is a moral principle which reason alone 
requires that we follow.32 Instead of defeating egoism, the arguments discussed here relocate the challenge 
the egoist is making. 
 
Arguments against egoism that appeal to principles P1-P4 seem more convincing than those that appeal to 
intuitions about particular cases, and for several reasons. First, arguments of the former sort have a more 
modest aim than those of the latter type. While the latter arguments purport to show that egoism is false, the 
former simply attempt to show that it is not a genuine moral theory. Even if the former arguments are 
correct, egoism cannot be dismissed; rather, its challenge must be understood differently. Second, it is hardly 
surprising to learn that egoism yields judgments that most people find counterintuitive (perhaps because we 
think of egoists as amoralists). It is more striking, however, to learn how at odds egoism is with second-order 
activities that we commonly associate with morality. This gives arguments that appeal to P1-P4 an impact 
that arguments which appeal to moral intuitions lack. And third, the basis of the appeal of P1-P4 seems to be 
linguistic (rather than moral) intuitions. P1 and P2 seem to be based directly on the meanings of moral terms; 
and though P3 and P4 refer to activities and not to meanings, they gain whatever plausibility they have from 
the fact that they are tied to behavior that, in ordinary discourse, delineates the moral realm. Of course, 
linguistic intuitions are not infallible; they may be incoherent or false.33 But if these principles really are 
supported by linguistic intuitions, their appeal is widespread; they are supported by advocates of conflicting 
theories. This does not ensure their truth, but it does indicate that it is appropriate to regard them as 
determining, in part, the realm of the moral. Arguments that appeal to principles such as P1-P4 might 
therefore be called "realm of the moral" arguments.34 
 
One other qualification should be made. Though arguments that appeal to principles such as P1-P4 seem to 
depict each of these principles as setting out a necessary condition for something's being a moral theory, such 
a position is too strong. If a view fails to satisfy only one of these principles, we may not be entirely 
confident in asserting that it is not a genuine moral theory; concepts like 'moral theory' do not have such 
sharply defined borders. It is when a view fails to satisfy several (or many) such conditions that we begin to 
feel confident placing it outside the realm of the moral. 
 
My account suggests that arguments against any theory that appeal to principles like P1-P4 are limited in 
value.35 They cannot show that a theory is false. At best, they show that a theory must be understood as 
presenting a challenge at a different level. If we regard the arguments this way, they lead us (if plausible) to 
the same conclusion about egoism that Rawls drew, though by a different route. As Rawls expressed it, "The 
significance of egoism philosophically is not as an alternative conception of right but as a challenge to any 
such conception."36 More generally, if these arguments have such limited value, then unless the method of 
appealing to intuitions can be salvaged or unless the methods can be combined,37 proof in ethics will have to 
be proof in the strict sense.38  
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